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Sages, Seers, and Saints: Creativity and Liminality in British Romantic Prose
Darlene Leifson
Western intellectual and cultural tradition frequently characterizes creativity in seemingly
contradictory ways. The artist, for instance, is often depicted as simultaneously alienated from,
and deeply connected to, the larger world. Creative work is also portrayed as both startlingly
novel and profoundly resonant with familiar, even universal, truths. While Plato decried poets as
subversive to the social order and banned them from his fictional republic, Friedrich Nietzsche
blamed excessive poetic inhibition for the death of sublime tragedy among the Greeks. Indeed,
despite narratives describing the transgressive, amoral, or personally tragic lifestyles of artists
there remains an equally strong tradition in the West of viewing art as beneficial to society, and
artists as creating to satisfy a moral obligation to their fellow beings. As psychologist Albert
Rothenberg writes in The Emerging Goddess: The Creative Process in Art, Science, and Other
Fields:
Society and creative people tend to be ambivalent toward each other. On the one
hand, society rewards creations with its highest honors and holds creators in awe
and esteem. On the other hand, there is a tendency to suspiciousness and even
fear because of the creator’s deviance from the rules and his emphasis on the new.
Sometimes widespread jealousy of the immensity of an individual’s achievement
even operates. Creative people, in their right, tend to feel strongly about society.
They tend to have strong positive feelings of concern for other human beings and
strong personal idealism. From their point of view, severe criticism of a
particular convention or of a factor of social order arises from such positive
devotion to other people. While they sometimes seek change or novelty for its
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own sake and sometimes feel resentful about being unrewarded and unrecognized,
they experience a severe discrepancy between their attachment for society and its
reaction to them. (7)
These seeming contradictions reveal artistic creativity’s essential neither/nor-ness, or in other
words, creativity’s inherent liminality. Creativity and creators often inhabit dual worlds
simultaneously, and as such, reside at a threshold, at both the “centre and circumference” of life,
to borrow a phrase from Percy Bysshe Shelley’s A Defence of Poetry (758). Several prose
writings by the British Romantics—specifically, William Wordsworth’s Preface to Lyrical
Ballads, Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria, and Percy Bysshe Shelley’s A
Defence of Poetry—are replete with such liminal characterizations of artistic creativity. For
example, Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Shelley each locate the poet and the poetic faculty at the
margins of society by virtue of their superior gifts or the poet’s revolutionary work; at the same
time, these authors also characterize the poet and his or her work are as indispensable to society,
and tend to locate artistic creativity at the center of all that is good and beautiful. These apparent
paradoxes initially suggest that the British Romantics (indeed, many Western artists and
philosophers) are either confused or ambivalent about the function of art and the role of the artist
in society. Acknowledging, however, that artistic creativity may be better understood as an
inherently liminal phenomenon may allow us important insights into why creators frequently
depict their lives and work in such contradictory terms. Indeed, creators may prefer to
emphasize the neither/nor-ness of their processes because there is freedom in creativity’s very
indeterminateness, to flout convention or to speak difficult truths. In order to bear up under
intense scrutiny, to find the courage to share one’s work the face of opposition—in short, in
order to create—artists may frequently describe creative endeavor in ways that provide them
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with significant personal validation for embracing a creative life. For the British Romantics in
particular, this means fashioning the poet/creator as the threshold figure of a sage, seer, or saint.
In his Preface to Lyrical Ballads William Wordsworth summarizes his philosophy of the
aims of poetic creation and the character and function of the poet in society. He states that his
purpose for writing a preface to Lyrical Ballads is to first address the “impropriety” of
introducing to the public poetry “so materially different from those, upon which general
approbation is at present bestowed” (595). Wordsworth explains that Lyrical Ballads represents
a revolutionary break from the poetry of the past—poetry that strikes out in new, unconventional
directions. By emphasizing his work’s novelty Wordsworth describes his poetry’s transgressive
position in comparison with the work of his predecessors. (We might also understand his
statements to be a kind of acknowledgement of the lack of approbation his transgressive poetry
has, to this point, engendered.) Paradoxically, Wordsworth goes on to assert that his poetry
derives chiefly from the “rustic,” “common,” and “plainer” language used by those around him
(595-596). The radical break Wordsworth makes therefore is to reject the artifice—the
“gaudiness and inane phraseology” of other writers—in favor of more natural expression (595).
His view, in fact, is that commonplace language and themes provide a more direct, concrete, and
accurate vehicle for authentic poetic expression than the artificial language of earlier poets. In
making these dual claims for his poetic creations Wordsworth renders them both separate (by
creating materially novel work) and connected to every day experience (by employing
commonplace language), in typically liminal fashion.
Wordsworth goes on to identify one of the “best services” to which a poet may apply,
that is, to increase the human mind’s capacity for subtle discrimination. Indeed, he finds that the
perils of modernity—the “great national event” of urbanization he sees around him—has tended
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to “blunt the discriminating powers of the mind” and that the poet, in particular, must function as
an opposing force to this trend. Wordsworth laments his own “feeble” efforts with which he has
thus far fought against the “outrageous stimulation” provided by modern life and literature (598).
In taking up this position Wordsworth rejects the urbanizing tendency of his time, again locating
himself at the margins of society, while simultaneously urging himself and others to act in the
best interest of society by countering this same trend through poetry. This liminal
characterization of poetic creativity and the poet as at once separated from, and deeply concerned
with, the world at large seems integral to the proper functioning of the poet and his or her art, in
Wordsworth’s view; the poet must distance him- or herself from the social and intellectual trends
of the day in order to be of greatest service to his or her fellow beings.
The strongest indication of this idea in the Preface occurs when Wordsworth undertakes
to define the poet. He asks, “What is meant by the word poet? What is a poet? To whom does
he address himself? And what language is to be expected from him?” (601). He answers that the
poet “is a man speaking to men” but that the poet is nonetheless
Endued with more lively sensibility, more enthusiasm and tenderness, who has a
greater knowledge of human nature, and a more comprehensive soul, than are
supposed by common among mankind; a man . . . who rejoices more than other
men in the spirit of life that is in him; . . . To these qualities he has added a
disposition to be affected more than other men by absent things as if they were
present; . . . he has acquired a greater readiness and power in expressing what he
thinks and feels. (601-602)
These statements are a succinct expression of the artist’s typical neither/nor-ness: poets are
necessarily human, but are also endowed with greater gifts than the average person. The poet
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sees more, comprehends more, and is better equipped to articulate his or her vision than others;
nonetheless, humanity remains the poet’s primary audience. Indeed, poet/creators must desire to
be so much a part of their social-cultural milieu that “it will be the wish of the poet to bring his
feelings near to those of the persons whose feelings he describes . . . and even confound and
identify his own feelings with others” (602). Poets thus choose to descend from a vantage point
of superior intuition to meld their identity with others in order to be of greatest worth to their
fellow beings. Wordsworth writes, “. . . the poet, singing a song in which all human beings join
with him, rejoices in the presence of truth as our visible friend and hourly companion”; “the poet
binds together by passion and knowledge the vast empire of human society, as it is spread over
the whole earth” (604). The poet’s superior gifts stand above humanity in order to unite
humanity, yet the poet does so as a human being: “Among the qualities which I have enumerated
as principally conducing to form a poet, is implied nothing differing in kind from other men, but
only in degree.” “But these passions and thoughts and feelings are the general passions and
thoughts and feelings of men.” “The poet thinks and feels in the spirit of the passions of men”
(605). Finally: “poets do not write for poets alone, but for men. . . . The poet must descend from
this supposed height, and, in order to excite rational sympathy, he must express himself as other
men express themselves” (606). The ability of the poet to liminally inhabit dual worlds—to be
both separate from and integral to the society in which the poet lives—appears to Wordsworth to
be indispensable to his or her functioning as a poet. Indeed, as Wordsworth goes on to explain,
this liminal, threshold capability places the poet “in the situation of a translator” (602).
Envisioning themselves as translators of truth provides a powerful, personal rationale for living a
creative life, and shifts the function of poet from mere wordsmith to sage. To satisfy his or her
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role as translator/sage the poet must, of necessity, inhabit dual worlds simultaneously—the world
of common, human interaction and the world of superior insight.
While Samuel Taylor Coleridge takes issue with some of Wordsworth’s literary
philosophies in Biographia Literaria, and while much of Coleridge’s criticism focuses on his
development of a philosophy of organicism in literary art, he shares with Wordsworth a similarly
liminal characterization of poetic creativity. He agrees, for example, that Wordsworth’s poetry
represents a transgressive break from the past. As Coleridge reports, Wordsworth’s “original
poetic genius” sparked significant controversy among his readers, leading critics to initially
dismiss his work (641, 646). The burden of innovation as a hallmark of creative genius has a
long history in Western culture and did not necessarily originate with the British Romantics,
although the Romantics may have done much to influence subsequent views of artistic creativity
in the West (Becker 45). Indeed, Coleridge’s essay highlights the transgressive nature of
Wordsworth’s poetry by describing how it inspired dismissal by his critics as well as an almost
religious zeal among his followers (646). The controversial nature of creative innovation
contributes significantly to a view of artists in Western culture as liminal figures whose
revolutionary work both annoys and delights, and remains a principal reason why we tend to
view artists as both subversive tricksters and wise sages. Paradoxically, by virtue of
revolutionary art’s neither/nor-ness, that is, by one’s work being seen as both better and worse
than what has come before, artists may find an authentic freedom to experiment with style, tone,
and form, as Coleridge suggests Wordsworth did (643, 645).
For Coleridge, however, authentic poetic genius does not equate with simple innovation,
nor with mere revolutionary form. For a work of poetry to be considered genius it must marry
novelty with a faithful adherence “to the truth of nature”; it must endow the quotidian with the
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gift of profound “imagination” (645). Wordsworth is for Coleridge a poetic genius because
Wordsworth has a unique capacity for infusing imaginative insight to everyday, universal
truths—in other words, to make the familiar, unfamiliar. Indeed, this was to be Wordsworth’s
special challenge for his Lyrical Ballads:
Mr. Wordsworth . . . was to propose to himself as his object, to give the charm of
novelty to things of every day and to excite a feeling analogous to the
supernatural, by awakening the mind’s attention from the lethargy of custom, and
directing it to the loveliness and the wonders of the world before us; an
inexhaustible treasure, but for which, in consequence of the film of familiarity and
selfish solicitude we have eyes, we see not, ears that hear not, and hearts that
neither feel nor understand. (645)
Poetic genius for Coleridge, then, resides at the threshold between the familiar and the
unfamiliar, between the dull, quotidian, realities of everyday life and the unseen, imagined, truths
hiding just below the surface, beneath typical human perception. In this sense the poet inhabits a
dual world in much the same way as Wordsworth articulates in his Preface: he or she sees both
surface realities, and, by special providence or gift, the unseen truths inherent in them. He or she
seeks out the quotidian—the low, rustic, common events Wordsworth speaks of—but for the
purposes of seeing hidden truths in the everyday world. Coleridge’s theory of organicism begins
here, with an organic fusion of nature and imagination, and the true poet, for him, is the person
who is capable of this kind of artistic unity. Coleridge writes,
[The poet] diffuses a tone and spirit of unity that blends, and (as it were) fuses
each into each, by that synthetic and magical power, to which we have
exclusively appropriated the name of imagination. This power, first put in action
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by the will and understanding, and retained under their irremissive, though gentle
and unnoticed control . . . reveals itself in the balance or reconciliation of opposite
or discordant qualities: of sameness, with difference; of the general, with the
concrete; the idea, with the image; the individual, with the representative; the
sense of novelty and freshness, with old and familiar objects; a more than usual
state of emotion, with more than usual order; judgement ever awake and steady
self-possession, with enthusiasm and feeling profound or vehement; and while it
blends and harmonizes the natural and the artificial, still subordinates art to
nature; the manner to the matter; and our admiration of the poet to our sympathy
with the poetry. (649)
This characterization of poetry and poetic genius is profoundly liminal, despite its references to
organic unity. Unlike Wordsworth, Coleridge’s poetic genius consists of nothing less than the
simultaneous and continuous habitation of the dual worlds of physical reality and poetic
imagination.
We must note that Coleridge’s theory of organicism argues for art that remains
profoundly integral with nature, in an Aristotelian sense: Coleridge approves of Aristotle’s idea
in the Poetics that nature embodies the ideal, and that the highest aim of the poet is to intuit that
ideal and embody it creatively in poetic form. Thus Coleridge’s censure for the artificial poets of
his day is reserved specifically for their failure to write this kind of organic poetry. Of Pope’s
translation of the Iliad, for example, Coleridge writes that Pope’s diction seemed to him
“characterized not so much by poetic thoughts, as by thoughts translated into the language of
poetry” (639). There is no organic unity of ideal truth and form in the work of past poets, and
yet for Coleridge this is the poet’s highest charge, by virtue of their superior powers of
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observation and intuition: they are minds that “feel the riddle of the world” (643). Thus, while
poets possess a deeper, more authentic perception of the world they are nonetheless bound by the
inherent laws of nature and truth. For Coleridge, an artist is not free to express his or her own
subjective view of reality. The artist is free only to embody in physical form what is ideally and
naturally true about the subject. If, for Wordsworth, a rationale for the creative life derives from
the poet’s threshold position as a sage—being both among others and having greater sensibilities
than others—then for Coleridge this rationale derives from the poet’s ability to both see the dual
nature of the world and to embody that reality organically in poetic form. In Coleridge’s view,
the capacity for simultaneously seeing and doing are the liminal qualities that validate the efforts
of the poet/creator. Wordsworth’s sage becomes, in Coleridge’s formulation, a seer.
Percy Bysshe Shelley’s A Defence of Poetry touches on many of the same themes as do
Wordsworth and Coleridge in Preface to Lyrical Ballads and Biographia Literaria. Shelley’s
conception of the poet not only shares similar liminal characteristics with these two other writers,
his view of poetry also encompasses all of creative endeavor. When Shelley writes that
“poetry . . . may be defined as ‘the expression of the imagination’” and “connate with the origin
of man,” he is, in effect, broadly defining creativity itself—that is, any imaginatively expressive
act (748). For Shelley, anyone who possesses the “faculty of approximation to the beautiful” is a
poet, “in the most universal sense of the word” (747). Shelley’s conception of poetry includes a
multitude of creative activities: “[It resides in] the authors of language and of music, of the dance
and architecture, and statuary, and painting; they are the institutors of laws, and the founders of
civil society, and the inventors of the arts of life, and the teachers, who draw into a certain
propinquity with the beautiful and the true . . .” (747-748). Here the poetic faculty is equated
with creative behavior in all its various manifestations.
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All creators, in Shelley’s view, share with Wordsworth’s and Coleridge’s poets similar
characteristics, many of which locate them, again, outside mainstream society. First, the
creator/poet is associated with god-like capabilities: “A poet participates in the eternal, the
infinite, and the one”; “poetry is indeed something divine” (748, 758). The poet/creator intuits
the truths of nature: “[Poetry is the] creation of actions according to the unchangeable forms of
human nature, as existing in the mind of the creator, which is itself the image of all other minds”
(748). Creators possess exceptional gifts and abilities, even refined moral acuity: “These and
corresponding conditions of being are experienced principally by those of the most delicate
sensibility and the most enlarged imagination; and the state of mind produced by them is at war
with every base desire” (759). The poet’s gifts remain unappreciated by his fellow beings: “no
living poet ever arrived at the fullness of his fame; the jury which sits in judgment upon a poet,
belonging as he does to all time, must be composed of his peers” (749). Finally, a creator’s
contemporaries may not fully understand his or her work: “a poet considers the vices of his
contemporaries as the temporary dress in which his creations must be arrayed, and which cover
without concealing the eternal proportions of their beauty”; “poets are the unacknowledged
legislators of the world” (749, 762).
Shelley complicates this conception, however, by dwelling simultaneously on poetry’s
beneficial “effects upon society” (749). In this view, the poet/creator’s marginalized role is
inverted and he/she is portrayed, not at the edge of society, but as essential to society’s growth
and progress. The poet’s may even be unaware that his/her influence is a directing force for
good: “A Poet is a nightingale, who sits in darkness and sings to cheer its own solitude with
sweet sounds; his auditors are as men entranced by the melody of an unseen musician, who feel
that they are moved and softened, yet know not whence or why” (749). Here Shelley’s imagery
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reveals another aspect of the poet’s liminal role: the creator “sits in darkness,” delighting in
his/her own “solitude,” while simultaneously “enlightening” and “moving” his/her audience.
The work the poet creates in seeming solitude for personal satisfaction alone also moves the
world. Creativity is also associated with superior morality. Indeed, Shelley asserts that “the
presence or absence of poetry in its most perfect and universal form, has been found to be
connected with good and evil in conduct and habit” (751). Like Wordsworth, Shelley also
inverts the poet’s marginalized position in society to one of complete identification with his or
her social milieu: “A man, to be greatly good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively; he
must put himself in the place of another and of many others; the pains and pleasures of his
species must become his own” (750). Thus the poet/creator has the capacity for moral good
inasmuch as the creator is capable, as Wordsworth also noted, of identifying profoundly with
others.
Shelley also agrees with Wordsworth that creativity has the capacity to combat the ills of
a society overrun by undesirable forces: “we want the creative faculty to imagine that which we
know; we want the generous impulse to act that which we imagine; we want the poetry of life:
our calculations have outrun conception” (755). For Shelley, it is the poetic/creative faculty
which grants freedom to the oppressed:
The cultivation of those sciences which have enlarged the limits of the empire of
man over the external world, has, for want of the poetical faculty, proportionately
circumscribed those of the internal world; and man, having enslaved the elements,
remains himself a slave. To what but a cultivation of the mechanical arts in a
degree disproportioned to the presence of the creative faculty . . . is to be
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attributed the abuse of all invention for abridging and combining labour, to the
exasperation of the inequality of mankind? (755)
Shelley rejects what he terms the “calculating” faculty of his age and even goes so far as to
blame “the mechanical arts” and the “calculating faculty” for enslaving humankind and blunting
the development of an “internal world.” For Shelley, creativity is the ultimate act of freedom,
and a poet is never more needed than when that freedom is threatened by the “accumulation of
the materials of external life” or when poetry is dismissed as obsolete or irrelevant (755). We
must note that Shelley wrote A Defence of Poetry to answer Thomas Love Peacock’s assertion in
The Four Ages of Poetry that poetry would become irrelevant in an increasingly industrialized
society. Shelley rejects this view, not by arguing for poetry’s practical or utilitarian qualities but
by insisting that creative energy remains a vital balancing force to the “calculating faculty.”
Poetic inspiration functions as a necessary guide to direct our practical inventions toward
beneficial uses (757). Compare Shelley’s view with that of Charles Lamb, as expressed in his
essay Sanity of True Genius. The association of poets with madness has a long and storied
history in Western culture, originating, perhaps, with Plato’s observation in Ion that poets can
only compose when “not in their right minds” (1128). Like Shelley, Lamb argues against
marginalizing creators and their work by asserting that poets, far from being “possessed” are, in
fact, in complete control of their reason. Poets are endowed instead with “the greatest of wit . . .
the true poet . . . is not possessed by his subject, but has dominion over it” (687). Like Shelley,
Lamb’s true geniuses are more capable, more balanced, and saner than the average person. In
Lamb’s words, the poet “ascends the empyrean heaven, and is not intoxicated” (687). Both of
these writers, then, reject society’s marginalizing of the creative person, either through
irrelevance or pathology, by claiming that creative processes are more necessary and more
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rational than the world would otherwise suggest. Additionally, both of these writers characterize
poets as marginal through their exceptional abilities, and not because poets are irrelevant or
irrational. In doing so Shelley and Lamb portray poets as liminal, threshold figures who are
capable of creative expression precisely because they inhabit dual roles: they are both
exceptional beings who stand apart from the rest of humanity, whose work is nonetheless
essential to moral and social progress. It appears that, for these writers, the freedom inherent in
the liminal situation remains of paramount importance to them; it is not simply that poet/creators
inhabit the fringes of society, but that they must be free to reject the trends of the world in order
to save it.
The creator envisioned by Shelley also shares with Coleridge the view that poets intuit
“the rhythm and order [of the world] which may be called the beautiful and the good” (758). As
does Coleridge, Shelley believes in the poet’s capacity to see the underlying patterns beneath the
surface of reality, and believes also, like Wordsworth and Coleridge, that the poet is a liminal
figure who stands at the threshold of these dual worlds in order to translate those visions into
formal poetry. But Shelley’s liminal conception of poetry/creativity pushes this duality even
further. He writes:
Poetry turns all things to loveliness; it exalts the beauty of that which is most
beautiful, and it adds beauty to that which is most deformed; it marries exultation
and horror, grief and pleasure, eternity and change; it subdues to union under its
light yoke, all irreconcilable things. It transmutes all that it touches, and every
form moving within the radiance of its presence is changed by wondrous
sympathy to an incarnation of the spirit which it breathes; its secret alchemy turns
to potable gold the poisonous waters which flow from death through life; it strips
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the veil of familiarity from the world, and lays bare the naked and sleeping
beauty, which is the spirit of its forms. (759)
Here Shelley makes claims for creativity beyond that of Wordsworth and Coleridge.
Poets/creators are more than the threshold sages and seers of Wordsworth’s and Coleridge’s
formulations. They are, in Shelley’s view, saints. Shelley’s conception that “poetry redeems
from decay the visitations of the divinity in Man” attributes a god-like quality to the creative
faculty; creators possess the power to redeem humanity from moral degeneracy and decay (759).
Shelley’s creator is a threshold figure who inhabits the dual worlds of mortality and divinity—
they are priests (“hierophants”) who expound the sacred mysteries (762). Indeed, his bold
statement that “Non meria nome di creatore, se non Iddio ed il Poeta [no one deserves the name
of creator save only God and the poet]” reveals the extent to which the British Romantics, and
Shelley in particular, threw off the constricting notion that poets were mere crafters of words and
were, instead, liminal figures at once removed from yet essential to society (760).
The saint-like creator envisioned by Shelley is not simply all-powerful in his or her
redemptive ability, but functions also as a conduit for inspiration which comes and goes
according to its own dictates. As such the poet/creator is a medium for the expression of
something that is essentially unknowable, unconscious, and mysterious: “A man cannot say, ‘I
will compose poetry.’ The greatest poet even cannot say it: for the mind in creation is a fading
coal, which some invisible influence, like an inconstant wind, awakens to transitory brightness:
this power arises from within, . . . and the conscious portions of our natures are unprophetic
either of its approach or its departure” (758). Shelley here articulates another liminal
characteristic of the creator/saint: while all-powerful, the poet yet remains an empty vessel to be
filled by divine inspiration. Indeed, the poet him- or herself may corrupt this divine
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communication through the very act of seizing upon it: “when composition begins, inspiration is
already on the decline, and the most glorious poetry that has ever been communicated to the
world is probably a feeble shadow of the original conception of the poet” (758). Again, like
Wordsworth and Coleridge, Shelley’s creator/saint functions as a translator between poetic
inspiration and the suffering world. In his or her role as saint the creator best functions when
self-effaced and self-sacrificing. The poet, in Shelley’s view, is an obedient servant of
creativity’s mysterious, even divine, Muse. Shelley’s liminal characterization of the poet/creator
as simultaneously all-powerful and completely self-effacing remains the boldest and most
extravagant claim for creative endeavor of all three of these writers. Indeed, Charles Lamb was
reluctant to go this far in his depiction of the poet as the sanest of persons: for him the possessed
person was “passive” while the true poet creates, “which implies shaping and consistency” (688).
Lamb’s poet remains after all a shaper of words, even though he inverts the role of poet from
insane to exalted being. In depicting the creator as a saint—categorizing the creator as he does
with the archetypes of shamans, wise men, and prophets—Shelley not only elevates the function
of the poet far beyond mere artisan, he creates a significant and powerful rationale for the
creator’s perseverance through exceptionally difficult but ennobling creative work.
The British Romantics’ view of artistic creativity persists in our own day and time
(Becker 45). Creators still self-identify strongly as threshold figures who, by virtue of their gifts
or sense of higher calling strive to serve humanity through their creative work. Paradoxically,
these same artists, by virtue of lifestyle or self-identification, prefer also to reside at the margins
of society. Such characterizations of artists have become almost stereotypical in western culture,
and many of these characterizations derive from artists’ own reports of their lives and work.
This complicated, even paradoxical relationship between the artist/creator and his or her social-
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cultural milieu appears to provide many creators—the British Romantics included—with a
significant source of validation for living a creative life. In the liminal role of sage, seer, or saint
the creator finds abundant freedom through indeterminateness and neither/nor-ness to define
him- or herself and to break with the past through innovation. Similarly, creators’ strong
identification with these roles also provides significant support for the extremely difficult work
of surviving persecution and criticism, persevering through creative blocks and challenges, and
sharing the fruits of their labors with the world. The very real need creators have to frame their
lives and work in such terms allows us to acknowledge, as does performance scholar Victor
Turner, that performances possess incredible power to shape identity, reaffirm or alter human
experience, and move us to action. Indeed, Turner saw creativity as emerging precisely from
such liminal spaces:
Postmodern theory would see in the very flaws, hesitations, personal factors,
incomplete, elliptical, context-dependent, situational components of performance,
clues to the very nature of human process itself, and would also perceive genuine
novelty, creativeness, as able to emerge from the freedom of the performance
situation (77).
The tendency to view performance as an empty fiction, then, may itself be a fiction. The
performance space that creators choose to inhabit may instead provide them with the requisite
freedom and support for sublime creativity. Indeed, we may argue that the most cherished
artifacts in Western culture arise precisely from the liminal situation that is creative endeavor.
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